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When compared to ASEAN, the EU, and NAFTA, the Northeast Asian region has lagged over the
past fifty years in developing even low-level interaction and synergies among the constituent parts.
Few people are accustomed at present to viewing Northeast Asia as having great potential for
consolidation. Even among those who imagine immense latent possibilities, it is easy to grow
discouraged at official inactivity, distrust and seeming stagnation. The slow evolution has numerous
causes, and some problems are more tenacious and unyielding than others are. The region is perhaps
best presently characterized by grudging coexistence rather than dynamic cooperation.
The aims for this paper are to be rooted in factual analysis while being forward-looking and
provocative. A list of top ten impediments to Northeast Asian dynamism provides a solid basis for
subsequent discussion. These are factors that need to addressed or overcome in order for new
initiatives to take root and to succeed; they are not ranked in order of importance:
1) Only bold or foolish observers are not intimidated by Northeast Asia's huge domain
Analyzing impediments to Northeast Asian dynamism has a major difficulty: the wide and multi-
faceted domain involves culture, logistics, politics, etc. Research specialists in management, policy2
studies and economics should not thereupon avoid the topic, thus ceding it completely to our bold
geopolitical security colleagues. Cross-disciplinary teams might be constructed to focus on, and
widely debate, topics such as regional & international economics, geopolitics, strategy, management
& logistics, historical legacy, and how to bridge language & culture differentials.
2) From poor regional definition to new development through boosting the rule of law
There may be substantial debate as to what constitutes Northeast Asia. But with ample dynamism,
the 'set of members' is not highly important. The general area has huge potential: some sections have
rich and underexploited mineral, timber, energy and marine resources; the populations are hard-
working and often well-educated: the region could be much more significant as a transshipment route
between the Pacific Rim nations and Europe. But economic instability and legal uncertainty limit the
area's appeal as a possible site for investment. This lack of confidence leads to fewer goods &
services being available at market and higher costs for available items. Some lessons may be learned
from the frontier development of North America in the 19th century. A basic flagrant problem was
with lack of services, but such services developed alongside the introduction of law, deeds and
property title. When asset values are captured to property title and deed, they can easily be
transferred and are the underpinning of subsequent lending and capital accumulation (de Soto 2001).
Use of risk capital is encouraged through legal safety mechanisms, providing redress from local
irregularities and regulatory impediments. No doubt better legal systems and enhanced administrative
transparency would improve conditions in Northeast Asia.
The European Union and ASEAN have achieved hard-fought developments in logistics, and in
balancing different systems of governance. They've gone far in collaborative standard-setting and the
development of consensus. Many lessons could be applied to help the countries of Northeast Asia
grow closer together. In constructing the EU, for example, agreements often were deliberately
constructed to gradually introduce multi-stage confidence building measures, time deadlines
(artificially determined) and subroutine triggers; implementation was often scheduled years ahead,
providing opportunity for less committed participants to backtrack or withdraw.
Imagery from the 19th century North American frontier provides a provocative idea: Why not open
at least part of the region to immigration - selected settlers from anywhere in the world might be
granted land to live upon and to develop. Parts of Northeast Asia have the scope, possibly at first on
a limited scale, to revive the Land Rush. This was the method where often thousands of people lined
up on a border, and at a signal, could enter a territory and claim land for a home and farm. The land
rush system has the benefit of populating an area quickly, with people bringing their own capital and3
energies and seeking to survive as best they can. A limited land rush in Mongolia or the Russian Far
East might involve pre-qualified participants or purchase of a license; the system might award land
parcels (or choice of land parcels) through lottery; achievement of legal title could require settlers to
take up residency on the property for a few years. Safeguards and details can be first arranged and
tested on a limited scale. At minimum the plan should arouse in many people throughout the world a
sense of curiosity and adventure.
In some respects the recent settlement of Oklahoma was the most remarkable thing of the present century. Unlike Rome, the
city of Guthrie was built in a day. To be strictly accurate in the matter, it might be said that it was built in an afternoon. At
twelve o'clock on Monday, April 22d, the resident population of Guthrie was nothing; before sundown it was at least ten
thousand. In that time streets had been laid out, town lots staked off, and steps taken toward the formation of a municipal
government. At twilight the camp-fires of ten thousand people gleamed on the grassy slopes of the Cimarron Valley, where,
the night before, the coyote, the gray wolf, and the deer had roamed undisturbed. Never before in the history of the West has so
large a number of people been concentrated in one place in so short a time. To the conservative Eastern man, who is wont to
see cities grow by decades, the settlement of Guthrie was magical beyond belief; to the quick-acting resident of the West, it
was merely a particularly lively town-site speculation." (Howard 1889 p.391)
Northeast Asia has a long history of revolution and change. The possibilities of a land rush can be a
positive stimulus; a new wave of energizing perestroika and great strategic positioning. To welcome
migrants and offer free land can be an important step to regional renewal and competitiveness, as
such a system does not now exist elsewhere.
3) WWII and the Cold War: a continuing legacy
Bitter memories of Japanese expansionism and WWII have yet to fully fade away. On top of such
problems are ingrained habits and structural vestiges of the Cold War. Nations in the region still
consider numerous issues unresolved, including a longstanding territorial dispute between Japan and
Russia. The distrust remaining from WWII is evidenced by regional friction and complaints
generated by the schoolbook authorization process of Japan's MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology) and upon visits by Japanese government leaders to Yasukuni-jinja
(which enshrines and memorializes the sacrifice of Japan's military war dead). The end of the Cold
War has also left its mark around the region, with the decommissioning of missiles and military
bases, the depopulation of certain defensive areas, and the rerouting of foreign aid and funds flows.
Substantial problems continue to exist within and between many parts of the region. China has
chronic territorial problems, notably as involve Taiwan, in addition to frictions generated from
thriving market forces conflicting with the ideological primacy of the Chinese Communist Party.
Such anomalies may continue, or China may be forced, perhaps by outside forces, to reconcile key
contradictions. North Korea's self-sufficient juche ideology often seems inherently divisive. There
have been great changes with Russia and Mongolian relations over recent decades.4
In addition to border disputes among various nations in the region, there is also unsettled sensitivity
to terminology, such as the Sea of Japan vs. the East Sea (日本海 / 東海); the former is favored by
Japan, and the latter by Korea.  Government officials from both North & South Korea boycotted the
Northeast Asia Economic Conference 2001 in Niigata Japan (run by Niigata area organizers & the
Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, ERINA 環日本海経済研究所) as the institute's
Japanese name referred to the "Sea of Japan Rim" (環日本海; see Asia Pulse 2001).
Even so, it is clear that substantial goodwill exists in the region. There are many successful intra-
regional investments and a widening market for intra-Asian tourism. There are a growing number of
cross-border students, grass-root civic exchanges and international marriages. Friction still can erupt
easily, however; politicians remain able to generate domestic media attention and gain personal
leverage by denouncing their neighbor states' intentions.
Intransigence and narrow-mindedness have held-up development in the region. I believe that the
Japanese leadership in particular has been misguided in failing to settle the territorial dispute with
Russia that has existed since 1945 (at least) over Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai islands.
Even today (May 2002) a large central sign just outside Tokyo Station (Yaesu side) proclaims that
"The Day the Northern Territories are Returned is the Day of Peace" (北方の領土   かえる日
平和の日). What is the cost of such insistence? One result is diplomatic gridlock between two key
nations, with Japan losing initiative and the chance to greatly influence regional development.
Demands for fairness and justice only polarize the region. Many islands could be created if all the
blood-soaked earth of WWII was piled together.
The antithesis to bitterness and recrimination is an emphasis on the common feeling of many who
have experienced war, and a possible campaign focus for Northeast Asian reinvigoration: we must
make the most of peace while we've the chance.
4) Central sclerosis limiting Russian regional development
Siberia and the Russian Far East are limited in their range of action because of controls from
Moscow. This is a common situation: frontier areas often chafe under strictures set by far-away
central seats of government (for example, Japan's southern Okinawa Prefecture would like easier and
expanded contacts with Taiwan, and there's much local support in Hokkaido and elsewhere for
increased trade and interaction with Russia). This case of Russia is special however, in that Siberia
and the Russian Far East are huge building blocks to regional prosperity. The isolation of the Russian
Far East could be alleviated with expanded regional contacts. Tourism holds huge potential, but it is5
still quite difficult to gather basic information and plan travel logistics. Kamchatka, for example,
presently has only one international flight per week  (to and from Anchorage, Alaska USA to
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky in the south). The area has rich natural beauty, much wildlife of possible
interest, and many hot springs that should attract tourists. But it is far easier to travel to areas such as
Southeast Asia that are better served by international airlines and do not require citizens of most
nations to obtain advance visas for tourism. Such rules are decided in Moscow.
Russia's geopolitical interests often internally conflict. Russia's European and Asian strategies are
often differently formulated, at least in part because of special efforts to develop new roles as relate
to the European Union and with NATO (through initiatives such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council and the Partnership for Peace). Possibilities are slowly developing for new projects initiated
within the eastern regions of the Russian Federation, but much is threatened by federal infighting.
Russia might gain increased international stature through bold development initiatives in Asia.
5) America's national and global interests are omnipresent but evolving
Today the USA is a key player in most regions of the world. Because US strategic interests abound,
US strategists wish to be kept abreast of new developments, and dislike being shut out of
deliberations. This is perhaps why the USA was at first (followed by Japan and Singapore)
antagonistic towards Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's concept of an East Asian
Economic Grouping (later dubbed the East Asia Economic Caucus EAEC). The area was encouraged
instead to devote effort to wider multilateral agreements such as the GATT and WTO. But at the
same time the North American Free Trade Agreement and the European Union were steadily under
development. The group finally came together with ASEM (the Asia Europe Meeting initiative) as
representatives of Asia vis-a-vis Europe. The grouping is now operational as ASEAN Plus Three
(ASEAN+3; the ten nations of ASEAN, plus Japan, China and South Korea), and their relationships
and interaction have steadily become closer. The USA is monitoring developments.
Other collaborative self-help initiatives that excluded the USA were also semi-stifled, only later to be
resurrected. The idea of an Asian Monetary Fund is becoming more substantial with the institution of
Bilateral Swap Arrangements, where Asian area governments will shore-up financial markets in
times of crisis (this Chiang Mai Initiative of ASEAN+3 was only belatedly endorsed by the IMF).
Kaur (2001) writes that during the 1997-98 financial crisis in Asia, the USA "adamantly refused"
Mahathir's efforts to monitor (and probably to limit) speculative funds flows, but now the USA urges
similar monitoring so as to identify terrorist fund flows. Opening-up Northeast Asia with any degree
of swiftness will involve major policy initiatives. It can be expected that the implications of such6
policies may be often difficult to predict, and new internal coalitions might involve outside interests;
the Asian Highway project, the trans-Afghan oil pipeline, the Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas),
Tumen River Development and KEDO are some such projects.
The USA can be a difficult counterpart to ally with because promised joint consultation is not always
accomplished. The US political leadership sometimes acts unilaterally before briefing allies; Japan is
quite familiar with this problem. There are often US domestic political reasons for unilateralism, or
secrecy might reflect wider strategic concerns. However US allies can easily confuse lack of prior
communication with arrogance, so it may be worthwhile that the US expends substantive effort to
avoid giving such an impression.
We live in an unstable, inconstant world, and policy should adapt to changing circumstances. The
USA is a major force in Northeast Asia in many ways, via accumulated goodwill, through corporate
investments, and militarily. The latter status includes substantial naval power and forward bases in
South Korea and Japan. Any search for Northeast Asian confidence building measures among
affected nations should consider the perspective of the USA, recognizing that initial animus may
evolve to ambivalence or accord.
6) Language and communications barriers
The use of English in Northeast Asia for discussions or conferences is reasonable in that it is not a
native language of the area; all are equally disadvantaged. However the language barrier is
substantial: it stifles confidence-building and limits wider mutual understanding, because many in the
area are accustomed to seeing one or more of the other nations as a threatening enemy. That type of
distrust is not easily circumvented nor quickly overcome, and substantial language barriers make it
difficult to build a common sense of mutual tolerance and reciprocity. The region could turn inward
and coalesce around the Japanese for their economic power, or around China for its huge population
and potential. On the other hand, maybe the area might embrace English as a second language even
more strongly to allow more widespread global competitiveness and reduce transaction costs when
dealing with the rest of the world.
It is also easier to cater to ignorance and to cultivate historical enmity than to build and develop new
cross-border initiatives or search for models of success. Demagogues and short-sighted patriots may
be pleased that language barriers keep many uninformed or misinformed about their neighbor's lives
and cultures. "Language barriers" is thus a convenient and value-free label for the continued
existence of misunderstanding. While there is some indication that Western-derived youth culture,7
even when inane, helps to bridge differences, the more classical arts and music are also often widely
appreciated and go some way in smoothing differences.
7) Korean partition
The present condition of the divided Korean peninsula is a substantial irritant to most parties
concerned. The USA has some 30,000 troops stationed in South Korea; other nations are also
actively responsible for armistice monitoring. The maintaining of fortified borders and high levels of
alert is very costly.
Korean people on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone have good reason to believe that reunification
may be largely outside their bilateral capability. This is tragic. The recent tagging of the DPRK by
the U.S. President as part of an 'axis of evil' gives further cause for alarm. Increased interaction at
both elite and grass-roots levels might help to defuse rhetoric, and identify enabling personnel who
might help with rapprochement. Regarding the DPRK society as a 'black box' permits added
extremism from any front.
8) Infrastructural challenges: climatic severity and scale of the wilderness
One of the characteristics of Northeast Asia is severe winter cold. Many parts of the region have
extensive flooding when snows melt; there are also large areas of desert. There are many mountains
and in general a low percentage of arable land. Overall, large parts of Northeast Asia have very low
population density and have yet to attract sufficient development resources. Many areas are isolated
and in need of basic communications, transport, and other infrastructure.
The severity of the climate and the challenge of transport combine with political barriers in serving to
preserve many resources that might otherwise have been greatly exploited. Major change is promised
due to new collaborative possibilities between nations, assisted by energies and capital from the
private sector. Even some physical barriers are being lowered. An advantage to the present trend of
global warming is the possibility that for a few months each summer commercial shipping may soon
be navigating the Northern Sea Route across the north of Russia. The opening up of that region to
ordinary shipping is likely to engender territorial and security friction, counterbalanced by the
promise of improved speed & lower cost via a one-third reduction of shipping distance between East
Asia and Europe (MacKenzie 2002). Newly connected rail & highway links will further cut costs.
Capital to fuel infrastructural development might reasonably become available from Japan, Korea,
Hong Kong or Taiwan. Until now, opportunity costs for investment in Northeast Asia have been8
high, as alternative investment areas such as Southeast Asia have promised better & faster returns.
This pertains to manpower and talent flows as well: the highly skilled have found places elsewhere.
This is changing in various ways as ASEAN develops: pioneers and early-adopters have made their
fortunes or taken their losses; business is becoming more predictable and perhaps less exciting. But
opportunity can migrate anywhere, but particularly to areas that have yet to catch-up to cutting-edge
technology and organization. Development in Northeast Asian could boost all the Asian economies:
lowering shipping costs in and out of the area, improving regional synergies, and possibly bringing a
peace dividend with diminished security concerns. Small efforts can bring big cumulative causation
benefits, where firms and clever individuals find it easier to join others operating in newly opened
regions. As already noted, in the last few centuries the USA attracted pioneers from around the
world; energetic, robust people flocked to the New World for adventure and opportunity. Pilot
projects for new immigrants and new settlements in Northeast Asia should be undertaken.
Tourism offers great potential and requires systematic promotion. Perhaps vigorous people can be
enticed to Northeast Asia in spite of, or even because of, the rawness of nature.
9) Lack of ideas: the mire of traditional thinking
Northeast Asia may be poised on the brink of greatness, but narrow thinking and inertia can still
prevail. One trend that can be distinguished is that many people are abandoning rural areas for life in
larger cities. Many, given the chance, will emigrate to foreign lands for greater opportunity. But is
the region prepared for further inward or outward migration? Japan particularly has been extremely
wary of immigrants, and many important social mechanisms promote harmony via homogeneity. The
danger of being different is summarized in the Japanese proverb "the nail that sticks up gets pounded
down" (出る杭[釘]は打たれる deru kui [kugi] wa utareru) - which encourages harmony regardless
of right or wrong. Fresh ideas and energies from outside might rather be a positive catalyst. Positive
change can be promoted by policies that include feedback loops and monitoring, along with
providing sufficient time for local adaptation.
There has been little to motivate leadership in the Northeast Asian region. Japanese government
initiatives face particular difficulty, as internal enmity and external opposition have both to be
overcome.  Japan is already part of the G-8. There is some choice in whether to remain on the
sidelines as an already-wealthy nation, or to grasp new opportunity. There should at least be room for
some Japanese people as individuals to seek out new horizons in continental Asia. The lands where
their distant forebears once lived can flourish anew with multiethnic pluralist communities.9
A weak domestic economy and local hardship can leave a population listless and lacking in initiative;
but hardship sometimes stimulates motivation and generates change. People respond differently to
adversity - as well as to opportunity! Nonetheless, there are ways to stimulate and reward creative
thought, new ideas, improvements in policy, etc. Any community that successfully develops such
ideas and such innovative people builds a good foundation for its future. There is great freedom and
some hope for unilateral action by nations or sub-regions for demonstrative leadership that avoids
chauvinism. The good example might motivate more-sluggish neighbors.
10) Establishing a coordinating focal organization has thus far been unsuccessful
Many major powers are involved in the Northeast Asian region. Both China and Russia are
permanent (non-elected) members of the UN Security Council. Japan has the largest economy by far.
The USA is not a geographic member of the region but has forward military bases, multiple interests,
and the potential to destabilize agreements. There are also, of course, major industries both from the
area and from elsewhere that are poised to prosper from consumer spending and/or government
procurement (including some that would welcome military alert and hostilities).
Investment projects by the private sector must consider potential risk, expected turn-around time and
return on investment. Early investors and public works contractors may generate windfall profits.
Favorable terms can be agreed with less-sophisticated local or regional governments that are poorly
briefed on full-cost calculations (for example, in cases of pollution) or that as yet are unconcerned
about resource extraction being unsustainable. Private sector dynamism has both positive and
negative effects.
There are important links between geopolitics and regional economic competitiveness. Supranational
alliances take time to formulate, to debug, and to institutionalize. While political and economic
leaders argue over the steps to putting key factors together, corporate interests, both domestic and
international, add to the din through lobbying and public affairs efforts, and with concrete operational
investments. Innovative projects may take unforeseen turns, and collaboration may be designed to
satisfy multiple goals (Europe, for example, now welcomes other nations using euro reserves to
counterbalance the US dollar). The citizenry waits or works for positive change: homes, jobs, peace
and prosperity. No one should hold their breath expecting quick major transformation in Northeast
Asia, yet we can steadily promote building blocks for future prosperity.
Bringing together a diverse group of nations poses various logistical problems as well as a need to
overcome distrust. Some form of development driver is critical for stimulating mutuality and10
communications improvement. In the Cold War (and in many previous wars) visions of a mutual
enemy provided reasons to circumvent both historical enmity and entrenched indifference. What
might be the driver(s) for bringing together Northeast Asia, and for promoting peace, prosperity and
growth in coming decades? Regional synergies, increased transparency among governments,
infrastructural development, and a dynamic private sector promise to boost economic
competitiveness. But such promise may not be enough to overturn the present complacency. Vision
and sustained efforts that focus and draw together diverse energies are greatly needed.
Domestic bureaucrats too often overlook the fact that their jobs have global ramifications;
involvement in such new areas may seem too divorced from their key domestic constituency. For
example, critics see foreign travel by bureaucrats as mere junket, an unwise use of taxpayer's
resources. However, good management and governance should be concerned with looking for
benchmarks and best practices, and for ways to aid development. Official travel might thus be
encouraged. Building synergies among areas that have long harbored mistrust might allow the
dismantling of expensive defense measures and the reallocation of critical resources, improving the
attractiveness of a region for new external investments. Much dynamism is generated by the private
sector, but collaboration and competition among public initiatives can also effectively trigger change.
There are many possible paths forward for Northeast Asia. There is every reason to continue with
developing grass-roots initiatives and multilateral associations such as exist in academia,
environmental awareness, transportation, etc. A major way forward may be if some nations in the
region fear being left behind by the others. India and Australia are for the most part eager to
cooperate with regional alliances. Why not include them? Should all interested parties, including
non-contiguous states such as the USA and Australia, be allowed to fully participate in future
projects? Will the initiative focus first around questions of security, defense, and non-proliferation, or
will it first be easier to institute organizational and social changes, or maybe concentration should be
centered on more basic needs?  These are questions to be debated and resolved.
Northeast Asia is sure to be a huge source of opportunity at some point in time. Many are working
hard that this growth comes soon. We might imagine that by the close of this century, the Northeast
Asian region could be at least as dynamic as today's Eastern seaboard of the United States.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -11
Some key coordinating initiatives & organizations involving the Northeast Asia region:
     (background attached for lesser-known initiatives; not meant to be a comprehensive list!)
 · Academic Forum for Northeast Asia, 環日本海アカデミックフォーラム
     appears almost wholly to be a Japanese activity; the Japanese name uses 'Sea of Japan Rim'
     http://www.joho-kyoto.or.jp/~acdfo/home.html
 · Arctic Council, 北極圏協議会
 · ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN+3, 東アジア (日中韓ASEAN首脳会議, 日中韓ASEAN経済大臣会合)
 · ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF, 東南アジア諸国連合地域フォーラム
 · Asia - Europe Meeting, ASEM, アジア欧州会合
 · Asian Development Bank, ADB, アジア開発銀行
 · Asian Highway, AH, アジアハイウエイ
 · Asian Monetary Fund initiative, AMF (proposed), アジア通貨基金
 · Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, APEC, アジア太平洋経済協力
 · Association of North East Asia Regional Governments, 北東アジア地域自治体連合
     36 local authorities from China, Japan, Mongolia, Korea & Russia; meeting from 1993, established 1996
     http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/kokusai/english/nearindexe.htm
 · Bilateral Swap Arrangement, BSI, 二国間スワップ取極
 · Chiang Mai Initiative, CMI, チェンマイ・イニシアティブ
 · Committee for Promotion of International Highway Project, 国際ハイウェイプロジェクト推進委員会
 · Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, CSCAP, アジア太平洋安全保障協力会議
 · East Asian Economic Grouping, EAEG, 東アジア経済グループ
 · East Asia Economic Caucus, EAEC, 東アジア経済協議体
     EAEG and EAEC were groupings unsuccessfully proposed in 1990 by Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad,
     now operational as ASEAN Plus Three (the ten nations of ASEAN, Japan, China and South Korea)
 · East Asian Vision Group, EAVG, 東アジア・ヴィジョン・グループ
     reported to ASEAN+3 2001 Summit on the future of East Asia (Prof. Sung-Joo Han, Chairman)
 · East Asia Study Group, EASG, 東アジア・スタディ・グループ
     responsible to ASEAN+3 for assessing the EAVG recommendations and the idea of an East Asian Summit
     http://www.aseansummit2001.org.bn/org/as2001/bp211-2.htm
 · Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, ERINA, 環日本海経済研究所, Niigata
     Japanese name, 'Sea of Japan Rim Economic Research Institute,' led to Korean boycott  (Asia Pulse 2001)
 · Eurasian Land-Bridge, ユーラシア陸橋
    New Eurasian Continental Bridge
 · Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, FEB RAS, ロシア科学アカデミー極東支部, Vladivostok
 · Fukuda Doctrine, 福田ドクトリン
     1977 policy speech in Manila pledging to build trust and "heart to heart" communication between Japan & ASEAN
 · G-8 (France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, European Community, Russia)
 · General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, ガット (関税及び貿易に関する一般協定)
 · Hokkaido Government, Trade and Economic Exchange Division, 北海道経済部貿易経済交流課
     impressive for multilingual communications (Japanese, Chinese, Russian, English)
     http://www.pref.hokkaido.jp/keizai/kz-bkkry/index-e.html
 · Institute For Northeast Asia Study, INAS, 環日本海総合研究機構
     (the Japanese name in this case uses 'Sea of Japan Rim' but seems not yet to have caused a problem)
     office in Tokyo also hosts Kanamori Committee; http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/~nbc/kanamoriiinkai.html
 · International Highway Construction Corporation, IHCC, 国際ハイウェイ建設事業団
     http://www.iijnet.or.jp/IHCC/prj.html
 · International Monetary Fund, IMF, 国際通貨基金
 · Japan External Trade Organization, JETRO, ジェトロ, 日本貿易振興会
 · Japan-Korea Tunnel, 日韓トンネル
     http://www.iijnet.or.jp/IHCC/sougou.html
 · Japan Sea Network Ltd., ジャパンシーネットワーク
     assisting contacts; offices in Niigata, Japan and Vladivostok, Russia; http://www.jsn.co.jp/guide_kigyou.html
 · Jilin University, 吉林大学, Northeast Asia Studies College, Jilin, China
 · Kanamori Committee, 北東アジア経済協力に関する金森委員会, 金森委員会
     office in Tokyo; http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/~nbc/kanamoriiinkai.html
 · Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO, 朝鮮半島エネルギー開発機構
 · Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, KOTRA 大韓貿易投資振興公社
     operate Korea Trade Centers around the world
 · Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, MIGA, 多数国間投資保証機関
 · National Institute for Research Advancement, NIRA, 総合研究開発機構, Tokyo12
 · North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, 北米自由貿易協定
 · Northeast Asia Development Bank (proposed), 北東アジア開発銀行
 · Northeast Asia Economic Conference, 北東アジア経済会議
 · Northeast Asia Economic Forum, NEAEF, 北東アジア経済フォーラム
     Secretariat at East-West Center, Honolulu
 · Northeast Asia Intellectuals' Solidarity forum, NAIS, 北東アジア知識人連帯運動
     Incheon Declaration 2001; http://www.naismovement.net/index.htm
 · Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation, 環日本海環境協力会議
     (the Japanese name in this case uses 'Sea of Japan Rim' but seems not yet to have caused a problem)
     http://www.env.go.jp/earth/coop/coop/neac_j.html
 · Northeast Asian Development Forum, 北東アジア地域開発フォーラム
     promoting Northeast Asian Highway and Japan-Korea Tunnel via International Highway Construction Corp.;
     webpage reference to Reverend Sun Myung Moon as being supportive
     http://www.iijnet.or.jp/IHCC/real.html
 · Northeast Asian Highway, 東アジアハイウェイ
     http://www.iijnet.or.jp/IHCC/sougou.html
 · Northeast Asia Project Development Center, NBC, 北東アジア・ビジネス協力センター
     Secretariat in Osaka; http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/~nbc/
 · Northern Forum, 北方圏フォーラム
 · Northwest Pacific Region Trade Center, 環日本海貿易交流センター
     project of Toyama Prefecture, Japan (another case where the Japanese name uses 'Sea of Japan Rim')
     http://www.pref.toyama.jp/sections/1302/kannihon/
 · Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies), Honolulu, CSISパシフィックフォーラム
 · Rajin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade Zone, DPRK, 羅新−先鋒自由経済貿易地帯
 · Regional Initiative -Russian Far East (U.S. State Department-sponsored program)
     http://www.ri.sakhalin.ru/
 · Shanghai Organization of Cooperation, SOC, 上海協力機構
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     between China, Russian Federation, Kyrgyz Republic, and Republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
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 · United Nations Development Program, UNDP, 国連開発計画
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